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Introduction 
The monetary theories that stem from the works of the medieval theologians 1 
share common roots. For Thomas Aquinas, during the second half of the thirteenth 
century, as well as for John Buridan, and later, for Nicholas Oresme in the fourteenth 
century, they appear as the result of careful commentaries upon Aristotle’s Politics and 
- to a lesser degree - Ethics 2. Not until  the publication of Oresme’s Treatise on Money, 
in the mid-fourteenth century  3, was the subject noteworthy enough to constitute the 
matter of a single essay which was not explicitly structured by a reflection on 
Aristotle’s works. This could suggest that the medieval fragments of monetary thought 
                                                 
* This paper was presented at a session of the XX
th Meeting of the History of Economics Society 
at Temple University, Philadelphia in June 1993, and at the Conference on Ancient and Medieval 
Economic Thought at MIT, Cambridge (Massachusetts) in June 1994. I am grateful for inspiring remarks 
by several participants, and I wish to thank Daniel Diatkine, S.M. Ghazanfar, Lucien Gillard, S. Todd 
Lowry, Antoin Murphy and Gianni Vaggi for helpful discussions and comments. I am also indebted to 
two anonymous referees of HOPE for their suggestions. The remaining errors are nevertheless my 
responsibility. 
1 The standard references on medieval monetary thought are dated from the decades which 
followed W. Roscher’s paper [1862] read at the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in Paris. 
They include the publishing of Nicholas Oresme’s Traictie de la Première Invention des Monnoies by 
L.  Wolowski in 1864, L. Wolowski’s own contribution [1864], E. Bridrey’s book [1906], and A.E. 
Monroe [1923] (parts I and II). More recent general accounts include B. Gordon [1975], O. Langholm 
[1983], C. Dupuy [1988] and [1989], and E. Lévy [1990]. Several contributions focused again on 
Nicholas Oresme, whose work became better known among economists after C.  Johnson’s  [1956] 
reconstitution of the Latin version of the Treatise, and A.D. Menut’s [1970] edition of Oresme’s 
translation of the Politics. J. Wolff [1973], R. Arena [1987], and L. Gillard [1988] - which includes an 
extensive bibliography - illustrate this revival interest. 
2 See Thomas Aquinas, In Octo Libros Politicorum (I, 7-8); In Decem Libros Ethicorum ad 
Nichomachum (V, 9); John Buridan, Quaestiones in Octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis (I, q. 11 and III, 
q. 21); Quaestiones in Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum (V, q.  16-17); Nicole 
Oresme, Traduction et Glose de la Politique d’Aristote (I, 10-11), Traduction et Glose de l’Ethique à 
Nicomaque d’Aristote (V, 11). 
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were roughly based on the same arguments as those elaborated some seventeen hundred 
years earlier, and consequently, that those fragments were nothing but narrow variations 
around the same undifferentiated output 4. Unfortunately - at least, for the plainness of 
the discussion - such an interpretation is bound to fail: the Aristotelian tradition paved 
the way for two divergent representations of money. The first one stresses the role of 
the Prince, whose authority alone guarantees the value of specie. Conversely, according 
to the second representation, money remains linked to the metal which gave birth to it, 
so that its value, as distinguished from its legal price, cannot be submitted to direct 
control. 
Thomas Aquinas on the one hand, John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme on the 
other hand, respectively illustrate these two representations - a « conventional » and a 
«  metalist  » theory of money (section 1). About three generations separate Thomas 
Aquinas from John Buridan, and Oresme probably followed Buridan’s lectures at the 
Collège de Navarre in Paris  5. Although mainly historical, the gap between Thomas 
Aquinas and Nicholas Oresme - Langholm’s 1983 essay is largely devoted to filling this 
gap - is also analytical.. A seemingly easy way to grasp the distinction between them 
would be to underline their sharp philosophical and political opposition. 
In the first case, this distinction lies in the oft-quoted opposition between 
Thomas’ philosophical realism and Buridan’s and Oresme’s involvement in fourteenth-
century nominalism  6. The difficulty here is to give a proper account of this paradox 
according to which a realist scholar - Thomas Aquinas - became nominalist for 
monetary matters, while nominalist authors - like John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme - 
                                                 
4 Applied to Oresme, this position was synthetically expressed by O. Langholm: « Oresme’s 
main frame of reference is very obviously Aristotelian. His conception of the function of money is that of 
the Ethics and Politics. His account of its required properties elaborates on the Philosopher’s catalogues. 
His insistence that money is a servant to the community rather than something subject to the royal 
pleasure, which underpins its entire argument, would follow from Aristotle’s political theory. The tyrant 
who debases the coinage is the tyrant of Aristotle’s Politics, who put his own private interests above the 
common good » (O. Langholm [1983], pp.16-17; see also [1992], p. 505). 
5 The question of the respective compositive order of Buridan’s and Oresme’s works is not 
clear-cut. Traditional -and conflicting - interpretations come from Bridrey [1906] and Kaulla [1904]. The 
former argued that Buridan borrowed all interesting material from Oresme, whilst the latter 
uncompromisingly viewed Buridan as Oresme’s teacher. O. Langholm ([1983], pp. 18-20; 99-107) gave 
a thorough account of this debate, enlightened by more recent textual evidence based on manuscript 
sources. He supports the idea that, although Buridan dealt with money in his commentaries on the Ethics 
and in the first version of his commentaries on the Politics before the publication of Oresme’s Treatise, 
he seems to be aware of Oresme’s contribution in the last version of question 11 on book I of the Politics. 
6 See, for example, C. Dupuy [1988], pp. 249 sqq. The standard reference on philosophical 
realism and nominalism during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries remains E. Gilson [1944], chap. 8 





































advocated a realist theory of money. Naturally, this paradox is chiefly an artefact. 
Firstly, Buridan’s and Oresme’s nominalism stood aloof from their predecessors’. 
Buridan, for instance, understood science as concerning concepts of first intention 
which point out not only a particular individual (pro subjecto), but also an individual in 
his general form (pro forma). And, as a Rector of the University of Paris, Buridan gave 
his approbation to the 1340 condemnation of the Ockhamist theses  7. But, even if 
Buridan and Oresme were closer to the Ockhamist tradition, it must be kept in mind 
that, except through the words in use, philosophical realism and nominalism have no 
evident relationship with monetary realism and nominalism. 
 In the second case, the distinction then becomes the monetary translation of the 
contrast between the Prince who holds the power he uses for monetary matters from 
God, and this other Prince whose private interest fades away into the interest of the 
community. But even a cursory examination suggests that this reading is inadequate. 
Although political theory indeed differs from Thomas Aquinas to John Buridan, and 
even more, Nicholas Oresme, their respective monetary conceptions cannot be thought 
of as mere consequences of the figure of the Prince that they depicted. The question 
raised by their political representations is to make them consistent with monetary 
theories elaborated separately; that is, to find a place, in this mutual embedding, for 
monetary policy. In this respect, Buridan and Oresme supplied a composite picture in 
which the Prince is an essential character (section 2). Acting as the efficient cause of 
money, he is expected to achieve the adjustments required by the real changes affecting 
money. But the question of the debasements of money gave rise to different lines of 
answers. While Buridan concluded with an identification of the Prince and the common 
good, Oresme drew a Prince whose power is partly controlled through adequate 
institutions and incentives, partly limited by the consequences of  his policy choices 
(section 3). 
1. The foundations of money 
Beginning with E. Bridrey’s work [1906], there seems to be a well-established 
tradition, chiefly among French scholars 8, which contrasts two interpretations of money 
in Aristotelian writers of the Middle-Ages. In Bridrey’s words, these would be 
                                                 
7 A qualified discussion of Buridan’s philosophical position can be found in R. Paqué’s [1985] 
comment on the « status of nominalists ». 





































respectively a « sign theory of money » and a « commodity theory of money ». It should 
be superfluous to point out that this difference would be irrevlevant if its design were to 
stress the opposition between 1) a theory of money which prevents it from being stored 
for commercial purposes, and 2) a theory coherent with the necessity of financing 
capital accumulation 9. However retrospective, Bridrey’s position is not so misleading, 
insofar as it suggests that Aristotle’s analysis did not resolve the question of the link 
between the metal and the money itself. B. Gordon’s more recent opposition between 
« non-metalism » and « metalism » - respectively originating in Plato’s Laws and in 
Aristotle’s Ethics, on the one hand, and in Aristotle’s Politics, on the other hand - might 
be understood as an attempt to explore this link 10. It gave rise to a sharp mercantilist-
like distinction between a «  non-metalist  » use of money in domestic trade, and a 
« metalist » use in foreign trade (see B. Gordon [1975], p. 48). Such an interpretation 
surely deserves more extensive discussion. But, even if we agree with this 
interpretation, it neither elucidates the reasoning through which they extended the few 
elements gathered in the Ethics and in the Politics, nor explains why they were extended 
in such different directions. In this respect, the distinction between what we called a 
« conventional » and a « metalist » theory of money aims at answering such questions. 
1.1.  Money as a convention: Thomas Aquinas 
Thomas Aquinas’ work illustrates the intellectual effort needed to separate 
money from the material which nonetheless composed it 11. At first sight, natural wealth 
rose out of a barter situation in order to become a means of exchange and of 
measure: « Specie is made of a thing ordered by nature » (In Octo Libros Politicorum, I, 
7). But after due consideration, money is seen to lose its naturalness: as the highest form 
of exchange, it is an outcome of human reason, henceforth separated from nature. 
                                                 
9 See O. Langholm [1983], chap. 3. 
10 B. Gordon [1961], [1975]. Gordon’s 1961paper was devoted to a criticism of Schumpeter’s, 
and - before him - Monroe’s view, according to which Aristotle was the actual forerunner of a « metalist 
theory of money » (see, for instance, J.A. Schumpeter [1954], p. 63). B. Gordon convincingly argued 
that, although Aristotle explained in the Politics that in order to be generally accepted, money should be 
composed of some valuable metal, this concerned historical conditions of acceptance, rather than the 
nature of money. So that one must wait until the time of Buridan and Oresme - to whom Schumpeter 
refused any originality on economic matters - to witness the birth of a genuine metalist theory of money. 
B. Gordon hence seems to have been more cautious in his 1975 book. But, on second thoughts, Gordon 
did not actually change his mind on Aristotle himself: he merely acknowledged that his work opened the 
path to rival interpretations of money by Aristotle’s medieval commentators. 
11 For a general account of Thomas Aquinas’ monetary thought, see B. Gordon [1975], pp. 159-





































Thomas Aquinas made this point quite clear while commenting on the Ethics and on the 
Politics. In the first text, emphasis was laid on the implications of money as a unit of 
measure: « it is convenient that there be a single thing which could measure everything, 
and this thing does not measure according to its nature, but because men decided for it 
to be » (In Decem Libros Ethicorum, V, 9). And in the commentaries on the Politics, the 
emphasis was on the role of money as a means of exchange, so that Thomas Aquinas 
concluded that « exchange by way of money was invented by reason, not by nature » (In 
Octo Libros Politicorum, I, 7). As is well known, these elements were to play a crucial 
part in the constitution of the Thomistic thesis against usury. Thomas’ argument is of 
special interest for the light it sheds on his understanding of money. 
Among the two functions of money, the idea of a means of exchange clearly 
refers to Aristotle’s teaching according to which, as a « material cause » of exchanges, 
money cannot be transformed into its own end, through an interest loan, without 
conflicting with its nature 12. When presenting this argument in a commentary on the 
Politics, Thomas Aquinas developed the idea that each end is infinite, while the means 
depending on this end are finite. He mentioned the example, drawn from Aristotle, of 
the physician, for whom his patient’s health is submitted to an infinite desire, whereas 
the medicines he will prescribe are finite. Hence, transferring the desire of this end 
constituted by natural wealth towards the means to obtain them - money - submits it to 
an infinite desire, which is a threat to exchange  13. Insofar, as exchange is not 
considered as a secondary institution but as a necessity for the existence of social life 14,  
usurious loans are also a threat to society. Although this analysis, fairly faithful to 
Aristotle’s teaching, was shared by most Schoolmen - John Duns Scotus, for instance - 
it already helps us understand that the question of money and usury in medieval thought 
does not depend on an insufficient specification of the functions of money. In particular, 
we could not argue that a more penetrating view concerning the functions money fulfils 
would have allowed thirteenth century theologians to admit that some interest could be 
paid on a loan by reason of this loan itself. The existence of such a function of money 
                                                 
12 See Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 78, a. 1, resp. The discussion is framed in terms of the 
distinction between « principal use » and « secondary use » of goods. A secondary use of money always 
remains available. In such a case - the mutuum ad pompam - somebody might borrow money to make an 
ostentation of a supposed personal wealth. This would allow interest to be paid. Nevertheless, the 
principal use of money « is to be consumed, that is spent in exchanges ». 
13 In Octo Libros Politicorum, I, 8. 





































would have added an analytical justification of interest, but at a great expense, for it 
would have prevented money from also being a means of exchange 15. 
The Aristotelian conception of causality then happens to be a prerequisite to the 
understanding of the Thomistic theory of money. But, if this conception of causality 
remains at the core of the analysis of the second function of money - unit of account - 
Thomas’ conclusions depart from Aristotle’s. In the Ethics (V, 5), the philosopher 
explained that « the money itself suffers depreciations, for it has not always the same 
purchasing power ». In this respect, money is treated exactly like any other commodity. 
It is precisely this point which Thomas Aquinas challenged, without ever stressing his 
opposition to Aristotle. The reason is that, as a « formal cause » of exchange, each 
alteration of money would not be an alteration of its value - as Aristotle seemed to 
claim - but of the standard of measure of any value, thus bearing inequity. The argument 
is introduced through the comment on Peter Lombard’s Liber Sententiarum: « the use of 
money does not draw the measure of its utility from this money itself, but from the 
things which are measured in money, according to the different persons who exchange 
money and goods. So that to receive more money for a lower quantity does not seem 
anything else than to differentiate the measure between what is given and what is 
received; and this obviously bears inequity  » (In Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, III, 
dist. 37, a. 1, q. 16). 
This discrepancy between Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ positions must not 
be underestimated 16. On the one hand, the emphasis on the unit of account function of 
money was to exercise a growing influence - among jurists, for instance, such as 
Panormitan, for whom this function constituted the main objection to usury: as a 
measure, money is necessarily sterile. But also, as we will see, among theologians far 
removed from Thomism, as Buridan and Oresme were. On the other hand, this emphasis 
                                                 
15 This also helps us understand the seemingly complicated device, in which the money loan 
itself, the mutuum, forbids any interest to be paid by reason of this loan, whilst extrinsic titles, such as 
poena conventionalis or damnum emergens make it possible, according to most scholastic doctors, to 
receive an income linked to the loan (on the interpretation of extrinsic titles in the context of the theory of 
usury, see Lapidus [1987] and [1991]). 
16 J.T. Noonan ([1957], p. 52) emphasized the divergence between Thomas Aquinas’ and 
Aristotle’s arguments. An opposite view was apparently defended by O. Langholm ([1992], p. 240). But 
Langholm’s interpretation of Noonan’s position seems to present this latter as assuming the purchasing 
power of money to be constant. I did not find such an assertion in Noonan’s analysis, who only said that, 
as a measure, money is different from the commodities it measures. On the contrary, Langholm considers 
that Thomas Aquinas solely argued that the consumptibility of money implies that, «  [i]f money is 
exchanged for itself, equivalence means paying back what was borrowed ». As a result, though both 
Noonan and Langholm acknowledge that according to Thomas Aquinas, money is, in some way, 





































played an essential part in Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of money as a valor 
impositus, that is, in the constitution of a conventional theory of money. Although it is 
not clear that the idea that money, as a means of exchange, definitely departs from 
natural wealth, it seems obvious that, as a measure, it depends not on the nature of 
things but on the will of men - in this case on the will of the Prince, whose virtue meets 
the end of the political community: money, Thomas Aquinas explained, « will be of 
price nil if the King or the community decides that it is worthless » (In Octo Libros 
Politicorum, I, 7). Such is the meaning of this etymological explanation, repeated in 
each medieval commentary on Aristotle, according to which « specie is called numisma, 
which comes from nomos, the law, because specie is not measured by nature, but by 
law. It is our power to transform it or to make it useless » (In Decem Libros Ethicorum 
ad Nichomachum, V, 9). 
1.2. The metalist theory of money: John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme 
Concerning Buridan and Oresme, we must acknowledge that their starting point 
was not so different from Thomas’. For instance, they seem to have shared this quite 
common idea that money makes up for barter failures. 
In question 17 devoted to book V of the Ethics, Buridan studied the necessity for 
money, and showed that it is an appropriate answer to the geographical scattering of 
sellers and buyers, to the non-simultaneity of needs, to the gap between possessions and 
needs, and to the indivisibility of some goods 17. Although the analysis was explicitly 
based not on the discussion of the Ethics, but on a reflection on the destiny of Adam’s 
posterity after the Fall, a similar position can be found in Oresme’s Treatise on 
Money 18. The consistency with Thomas Aquinas’ views still extends through this 
typical exercise in Aristotelian metaphysics which consists, for Buridan, in drawing out 
the four causes of money: « The material cause is what money is made of [...]. The final 
cause is that man, with money, can have these things which are necessary for life. The 
                                                 
17 In Decem Libros Ethicorum, V, q. 17, a. 1, proofs 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
18 « When the Almighty was dividing out the people, when He was separating the sons of Adam, 
He fixed boundaries of the nations. Next, men multiplied on earth, and possessions were divided out as 
suitable. Now, the result of this is that one had more of one thing than he needed: another had little or 
none; and for another thing, it was the opposite, so that someone had perhaps a great number of sheep 
and no bread, as opposed to the peasant. And even, one place abounded in one thing, and lacked another. 
So, men began to trade without money, one man gave another a sheep for some wheat, another his labour 
for bread or wool, and so on. [...] However, there arose many difficulties in the exchange and the 
transport of things. Men were so clever that they invented the use of money, as the instrument of 





































formal cause is the figure of money, and the sign of the weight of money of such value. 
The efficient cause is the Prince, who has the government of the city, or the community 
of the citizens » (In Octo Libros Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 1, note 1). Again as in Thomas 
Aquinas, money is set in the distinction between natural and artificial wealth. This is 
true for Buridan, who distinguished wealth « per se », constituted by natural wealth, and 
wealth « per accidens », represented by money (Ibid., note 3, doubt 2, note 2), as well 
as for Oresme who imagined someone starving to death although he owned a great 
quantity of money, to explain that money is artificial wealth used in the exchange of 
natural wealth (Treatise, chap. 1). 
From this point on, the connection between Thomas Aquinas’ views, on the one 
hand, and both Buridan’s and Oresme’s views, on the other hand stops. For Thomas 
Aquinas, when such a commodity becomes money, it is as a result of the will of men, 
which definitely breaks the link between this money and gold or silver as commodities. 
Conversely, in the writings of Buridan and Oresme, if the institution of money requires 
the figure of the Prince, such a requirement does not mean that the metal of which the 
money is made henceforth plays no part. 
In spite of the demonstrative guise of the statement - mainly in Buridan’s work - 
this could be nothing more than a petitio principii. But a more careful examination 
shows that the opposition between these two conceptions of money rests on sounder 
foundations. The argument deals with the same elements as those that Thomas used: 
firstly, the understanding of money as a measure of values; and, secondly, the 
conditions that allow the emergence of money from a stock of metals which could be, 
like natural wealth, allocated to different uses. 
The first question was raised by Buridan while commenting on the Ethics. The 
purpose here was clearly to contradict the Thomistic reading of Aristotle: «  Some 
people [like Thomas Aquinas; A.L.] say that the Prince imposes the quantity of value of 
the money, and that, according to the imposed value, it measures the exchanges: this is 
why Aristotle said that money is not by nature, but by name, and it is up to us to make it 
useless »  (In Decem Libros Ethicorum, V, q. 17, a. 2). Conversely, Buridan’s 
interpretation is that in some circumstances, the Prince can indeed impose the name of 
the money - call it, for instance, « denier » or « obole » - but he cannot, unless he 
commits an injustice, impose its value. The reason put forward is of special interest. If 
money is a measure of value, whereas this latter was already established as being 
measured by human needs, this could only be because the material of which the money 





































an immediate but an intermediary measure of values 19. Hence, it is the necessity for 
money to fulfil a function of measure of values that requires the indissolubility of the 
link between this money and the metal of which it consists. 
The second question arises in Oresme’s writings, and again, though their 
conclusions differ, its starting point is akin to Thomas Aquinas’. Exactly as the latter, 
Nicholas Oresme, reading the Politics, recalled the Aristotelian difference between the 
«  principal use  » and the «  secondary use  » of a good -  consumption and exchange 
respectively 20. Now, the particularity of money is the interchange between the contents 
of both these uses of the metal of which it is constituted. In the Thomistic approach, the 
institution of money precisely led to this inversion of contents between principal and 
secondary uses. From then on, there was a definite break between a commodity used to 
make a display of one’s fortune, on the one hand, and a monetary sign fulfilling a 
function of intermediary of exchanges, and of unit of account, on the other hand 21. But 
such a break does not exist in Oresme’s perspective, merely because he explicitly 
considered their respective contributions to the determination of the demand for money. 
In this connection, shifting from the point of view of the money already 
instituted to the point of view of the metal this money is made of leads us to 
acknowledge that it cannot be reduced to a single - principal - use excluding exchange. 
In other words, when such natural wealth comes to be used as money, it is not the result 
of an arbitrary decision, either of the Prince or of the exchangers: this natural wealth 
becomes a means of exchange and a unit of measure because it already has some 
specific quality required for money. For example, when Oresme discussed the 
genealogy of monetary transactions, he recalled the fact that « when men first began to 
trade, or to compare wealth through the use of money, there was not yet any stamp or 
image on money; but a certain amount of  silver or copper was given for a drink or 
food » (Treatise, chap. 4). It is easy to conclude that money holds its principal use from 
                                                 
19 Nevertheless, this human need which measures gold or silver is only the need of the rich, who 
« lack it for their superfluities in sumptuousness or in outward goods » (In Decem Libros Ethicorum, V, 
q. 17, a. 2). This is in accordance with Buridan’s interpretation of the way human needs affect the price 
of a commodity: the need in account is only the need of those who are able to afford to buy this 
commodity (Ibid., q. 16, answer to doubt 1). Whereas Buridan’s distinction between « immediate » and 
« intermediary » measure of exchange is already an echo of the Thomistic idea of a « double measure » 
(need - indigentia - and money),  a similar position can also be found in Oresme’s gloss on the Ethics, 
when he again opposed « need » and « money » as « natural » and « artificial » measures (Traduction et 
Glose de l’Ethique d’Aristote,V, chap. 11). Nonetheless, Oresme’s discussion was much more succint 
than his predecessor’s. 
20 Traduction et Glose de la Politique d’Aristote, I, 10. 





































the generalization of what was nothing but a secondary use of the metals which 
constitute it. That this generalization should be feasible is then convenient: in order to 
be used for monetary purposes, precious metals must be in large enough quantity to 
guarantee that the satisfaction of the principal use of these metals will leave a surplus 
available. Interestingly, Nicholas Oresme did not argue that the demand for money and 
the demand for metal as such are substitutes. The mechanism underlying the examples 
presented in the Treatise leads one to regard the quantity of money available for the 
community as the output of a sequential process: this quantity clearly comes from the 
surplus of precious metals, once its share necessary for non-monetary uses has been 
withdrawn. This is what is suggested in chapter 2 of the Treatise, for instance: « there 
must be enough of such material. That is why, if there is not enough gold, money is also 
made of silver; but if one does not have these two metals or not in sufficient quantity, it 
is necessary to make an alloy or a simple money in another pure metal: thus it was 
formerly made of copper. [...] [A] large quantity of these metals must not be allowed to 
be put to other use, to the extent that there is not enough left for money ». 
  This understanding of the relation of metal to money brings about a significant 
improvement, when compared to Thomas Aquinas’ perspective. His analysis of money 
stopped before actually studying other effects of its value than those that concern 
distributive justice. Conversely, for Oresme, if a variation of the value of money does 
have distributive effects, it is because this variation is related either to the stock of 
metals or to the share available for monetary ends. Hence, the question of the value of 
money becomes noteworthy. Of course, this looks like a quantitativist approach to 
money 22. But there is nothing more: it only looks like it, and Oresme’s position is far 
more complex.  
A first reservation comes from the fact that the value of money is not determined 
by its quantity, but by the value of the commodity of which it is made. For example, 
when in chapter 10 of the Treatise Oresme discussed the question of the relative values 
of gold and silver money, he clearly deduced these from the values of gold and silver as 
metals: « [...] there must be an habitual and fixed relation in value and price between 
gold money and silver money. For as gold is by its nature more precious, rarer than 
silver, and more difficult to find or to hold, this gold, for an equal weight, must be worth 
                                                 
22 See the classical interpretation by W. Roscher [1862], resumed by E. Bridrey [1906], and for 
a criticism of this interpretation, L. Gillard [1988]. J. Wolff ([1973], p. 80; see also R. Arena [1987]) 
acknowledged that Oresme had an approximative intuition of a quantity theory of money, but wondered 





































more than silver in a fixed ratio » 23. A similar observation could be made when reading 
in chapter 3 the discussion of the case in which « sometimes in a country, there is not 
enough silver, in proportion to natural wealth; and [the] small amount of silver [...] 
which should be given in justice for a pound of bread or the like, would be less easily 
handled, because of its extreme smallness  »: the way the problem itself was stated 
shows that this money, given « in justice » for a pound of bread, only owed its value to 
the just price of silver, as a metal, in a country in which it did not abound 24. 
Moreover - and this is the second reservation - although a variation in the 
quantity of metal can indeed generate a nominal adjustment, other kinds of adjustments 
were explicitly imagined by Nicholas Oresme. His analysis dealt as much with the value 
as with the structure of money  25. This structure (gold, silver or copper money; pure 
money or alloy), as already noted, depends on the amounts of the different metals and 
on the surplus that can be used for money, but also on the value of the exchanged goods 
and on the size of the transactions - trade on « a large and big scale » or on « a smaller 
one » (Treatise, chap. 3). In this respect, Oresme opposed gold money « more fitted 
for larger  exchanges »  (habilis ad mercaturas majores) to silver money «  for the 
purchase of smaller goods » (pro emptione mercimoniorum minorum). So that, in the 
best of cases, a variation concerning any of these determinants gives rise to a structural 
adjustment of the money circulating in the community, or even the emergence of a new 
type of money - this is, according to Oresme, « the origin of black money, which is 
suitable for small purchases » (Ibid.), in countries where the available quantity of silver 
is insufficient 26. 
                                                 
23 This formulation seems puzzling. One would be tempted to recognize here one of the first 
formulations of the idea that the price of a commodity - here, gold or silver - is determined by its rarity 
(see E. Bridrey [1906], p. 193). But personally, I should hesitate to take the plunge. For when Oresme 
mentioned the rarity of gold or silver, he considered this as an element of their nature, on the same plane 
as preciosity. This would then seem to be connected with the question of commutative justice, in which 
the relative values of goods are given to the exchangers. Another argument was interestingly put forward 
by L. Gillard [1988]: in support of the idea that Oresme never established any link between price and 
rarity, he noticed that the word in use in chapter 2 of most manuscripts of the Treatise was « cara » 
(expensive, or noble) and not « rara » (rare). 
24 Other cases of nominal responses could be found in Buridan’s works. See, for instance, In 
Octo Libros Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 2, note 2. 
25 L. Gillard [1988] considered as Oresme’s only original analytical contribution, his distinction 
between two types of adjustment, when one faces a shortage of gold or of silver money. 
26 « And thus very conveniently, where silver does not abound, there are three materials [instead 
of two; A. L.] for money, the first being gold, the second silver, and the third black alloy » (Treatise, 
chap. 3). This idea is further developed in chapter 13, in which Oresme clearly mentioned a symmetrical 






































But what if this structural adjustment or this emergence were to be lacking? 
Oresme’s answer only appears indirectly: quoting Cassiodorus, he sides with this king 
of Italy who « ordered for the gold and silver to be removed from sepulchres of the dead 
where, according to people’s custom, they had been buried, then he asked them to be 
made into money for the public use, saying it was a sort of sin to leave useless in burial 
grounds, what can be of use for the living » (Ibid., chap. 2). Why was it such a sin to 
leave gold in sepulchres? Because the available stock of metal was not large enough to 
generate a sufficient surplus which could be converted into money, and because no 
other material could fulfil this function. In this circumstance, the price of money, as 
determined by the price of the metal, was too low to authorize the current volume of 
trade to be performed. Only this could justify such an exceptional measure, which 
infringed on the most relentless interdicts. Analytically, this means that when all the 
nominal and structural adjustments are made, a variation in the quantity of money could 
only give birth to real effects, affecting the level of the transactions. 
In this operation, which leads us from the recognition of the link between money 
and its material support, towards the intuition of its possible real effects, the attempts to 
grasp the theoretical content of « black money » (i.e.copper money, since copper coins 
turn black in use) appear to have played a crucial part. As S.T. Lowry [1994] points out, 
this question of « black money » is far from being only anecdotal. It is important both 
from an analytical, and from an historical point of view. S.T. Lowry links them up by 
recalling Buridan’s outstanding statement of the six «  qualities  » of money, which 
seems to have influenced most subsequent writers (see, for example, A.E. Monroe 
[1923], p. 24). Introduced in a discussion on the Ethics, these qualities are presented as 
follows: « One [quality] is that it be of small quantity, for then subtraction cannot be 
made from it without easy detection. The second is that it be impressed with the stamp 
of some prince, for otherwise anybody might fabricate and falsify money, by which 
equality in exchange would be done away with. The third is that it be of fixed weight, 
for otherwise a fixed price cannot be put on commodities by means of it. The fourth is 
that it endure well without corruption, for otherwise future demand [indigentia] cannot 
be provided for by means of it. The fifth is that it be of a precious material so that a high 
value can be laid up in a small space and be easily carried to distant place. The sixth is 
that it be divisible into smaller units, especially on account of the poor, who frequently 
need a variety of things at minimal prices  »  27. Whereas some or all the five first 
                                                 
27 (In Decem Libros Ethicorum, V, q. 17, a. 1, proof 4. O. Langholm’s [1983], p. 80 translation). 
For the sixth quality of money, the Latin text reads: « Sexta, quod sit ad parva divisibile, specialiter 





































qualities of money seem to have been shared by several theologians, even prior to 
Buridan (O. Langholm [1983], chap. 7), the sixth appears more specific  28. Although 
Buridan does not use explicitly the expression « black money », this last quality clearly 
refers to that kind of specie, composed of materials inferior to gold or silver, needed by 
the poor for « petty trade ». And it is from this particular juncture, between a social 
category, a type of trade, and a type of goods that the idea of a structural adjustment 
from money to trade might have emerged: i) the desirable quantity of « black money » 
is determined by the needs of the poor, and it seems not to allow any nominal 
adjustment through the prices of goods, since these needs are far from being fully 
satisfied; ii) silver money - and, of course, gold money - could not make up for a 
shortage of « black money », since it would be inadequate to petty trade; iii) on the 
contrary, lack of silver money could be compensated by « black money », even if this 
latter does not satisfy the necessities of large scale trade as well as noble money would. 
It is thus manifest that, whereas Buridan’s comments on Aristotle contained the seeds of 
the principle of a structural adjustment, this latter idea did not blossom before Oresme’s 
contribution. 
To sum up, though in the writings of John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme we do 
find the foundations of a metalist theory of money, these cannot be easily reduced to a 
quantitativist - and still less to a dichotomic - perspective. The Treatise on Money, into 
which are gathered the main pieces of the debate, seems to advocate a different 
approach, which subordinates the volume and the structure of money to the structure 
and level of trade. 
2. The monetary functions of the Prince 
What then is the exact place of the Prince? The question is not so innocent, for it 
is not obvious that he has any. If one is interested in the search for a monetary policy, 
the metalist theory of money intuitively suggests that there is very little room for it. But 
on second thoughts, an inquiry into the economic function of the Prince will help 
reconsider this intuition. 
                                                 





































2.1. The common good, and the Prince as an efficient cause of money 
For Buridan as for Oresme, the Prince is the agent of the realisation of the 
« common good ». Far more complex than it may appear, in Buridan’s writings this idea 
opened the path to a brief but precise analysis of the basis of the power of the Prince 29. 
These are the result of a crossing of two distinctions  30: firstly, between a « private 
good » and a « common good », this latter being understood as the set of the private 
effects of a public action, or as the externalities associated with a private good; 
secondly, between the « absolute good [bonum simpliciter], which is the good of the 
soul, and the secondary good, which is the good of the body  » (In Octo Libros 
Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 2, note 9).  
One may conclude from Buridan’s comments that these different goods are 
lexicographically ordered, an absolute good always being preferred to a secondary 
good, and, after this first choice was made, a common good being preferred to a private 
one. Hence, the absolute common good came first, followed by the absolute private 
good, then by the secondary common good, and lastly by the secondary private good. 
Of course, this order reflects a moral scale of values, independent of any individual 
preference. The Prince is expected to share this scale of values and to contribute to its 
implementation. As the members of the community usually manage their private goods, 
it then behoves the Prince to take care of the common - absolute and secondary - good. 
This task is difficult, because it bears two kinds of potential conflicts: not only with the 
highest forms of any absolute private good, but also with the Prince’s own private good. 
It is then also restricting, for it necessitates much more virtue for the Prince than for all 
those who are under his authority, in the sense that his private good must be kept behind 
all other superior goods. And whenever this mission is betrayed by the one whose duty 
it is to pursue it, the fault is serious enough to release his subjects from the obedience 
they owe to their Prince - at least, when he is elected - or even to oblige them to depose 
him 31. 
The monetary power of the Prince hence settles into this understanding of his 
function. Money is a typical instance of an institution which participates in the common 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting that this discussion is clearly linked with the study of money, for it arises in 
question 11 of Buridan’s commentary on book I of the Politics, which was especially dedicated to « the 
debasement of money ».  
30 The second distinction, at least, apparently referred to Aristotle’s study of the different kinds 
of goods in the Rhetoric (I, chap. 5) 





































good: the state of trade calls for a determined quantity and structure of money, but 
although some spontaneous mechanisms could allow this, this is only up to a certain 
point, and there is no guarantee that a shortage in gold or silver would not affect the 
level of trade. So that it behoves the Prince to withdraw metals from private uses and 
convert them into money, or even to change the value of money 32, in order to improve 
the common good. In other words, the management of money comes down, at first, to 
preventing it from having real effects 33. 
But the role of the Prince is still more fundamental, for he is admittedly the 
« efficient cause » of money. The significance of this efficient cause can be approached 
through this example from the commentaries on Politics, in which Nicholas Oresme 
described an odd evolution which ends with a monetary economy governed by a Prince. 
This evolution did not start with the barter economy we would today imagine, but with 
a state of trade in which the secondary use of gold as a metal allowed this gold to be 
used as a means of exchange. The difficulty, which was to justify the action of the 
Prince, lay in the fact that such «  money  » posed a permanent uncertainty, widely 
acknowledged by medieval commentators of the Politics as by Aristotle himself  34, 
concerning the value it represented: « People had too much trouble in weighing money, 
and all could not easily recognize whether it was made of a genuine material. 
Consequently, the Prince had his mark stamped on it, as his figure or any sign which 
attests to the genuineness of the material and of the weight » 35. For if at this time the 
                                                 
32 Buridan mentioned the case in which there would be « too high an increase of the material, 
which means that this material is too common and too cheap [nimis vilis] » (In Octo Libros Politicorum, 
I, q. 11, a. 2, note 2). It must be noted that the nominal response concerning the value of money is not 
automatic, but results in a - licit - decision of the Prince. Concerning, now, Oresme, L. Gillard [1988] 
reached about the same conclusion, but through a slightly different approach. Studying the exceptions to 
the rule forbidding any debasement of money, he concluded that, for Oresme, the management of money 
by the Prince was a consequence of the variations of the natural wealth circulating in the economy. 
33 See the already quoted example of gold removed from sepulchres of the dead, discussed by 
Oresme (supra, p. 12).  
34 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas’ commentaries on the Politics (I, 7). A.E. Monroe ([1923], 
p. 23) nonetheless mentions Oresme’s originality when the latter explains coinage not only by « the 
trouble of weighing but also [by] the difficulty of recognizing the quality of the metals ». 
35 Traduction et Glose de la Politique d’Aristote (I, chap. 11). A similar, more detailed, analysis 
occupies chapter 4 of the Treatise. But an interesting difference is that in this last text - written before the 
commentaries on the Politics - Oresme did not stress the role of the Prince, but insisted on « the wise men 
of that time [who] sagaciously thought that coins should be made of a fixed material and of definite 
weight, and that a figure should be stamped on it, in order to show officially to all the quality of the 
material and the fair weight of the coins, and to make it possible to know the value of money ». There 
does not seem to be a definite discrepancy between the Gloss on the Politics and the Treatise. On the 
contrary, this helps understand the role of reason in the institution of money by the Prince, this last acting 





































money was for each individual a necessity of reason, it could not come into the world 
without the intervention of a public authority. This needs further explanation, for it 
determines what we previously accepted without discussion - the transformation of a 
metal into money.  
Before the intervention of the Prince, gold was used as money, but it was not 
money: it possessed all the causes of money, but its efficient cause was limited to the 
individual who supplied it, and who guaranteed its material as well as its weight. So that 
it was only through its secondary use that gold could facilitate exchanges. Later on, 
when certifying the money, the Prince suppresses the uncertainty on the conditions both 
of its material cause (the genuineness of the material), and of its formal cause (the 
weight, leading to a value). It is precisely this certainty, which concerns a material and a 
measure, which makes it possible to interchange the principal and the secondary use, 
that is, to transform gold into money. 
This is another way to grasp the contribution of the Prince to the common good: 
he not only manages, in some extreme cases, the quantity and structure of the money, 
but he also allows money to exist as such. This is the reason why most debasements of 
money seem to have been so sternly rebuked by Buridan and Oresme. 
2.2. The question of the debasements of money 
Both Buridan and Oresme supplied a classification and an analysis of the various 
kinds of debasements. Buridan dedicated the whole article 2 of question 11 on Book I of 
Aristotle’s Politics to this issue - which makes it clear that Oresme was not the first 
scholar to offer a systematic account of the problem. He distinguished between 
debasements concerning the material, the weight, the figure, the appellation and the use, 
and added some remarks on the debasements of the value of money 36. Later, Oresme 
tackled the question in the Treatise on Money, in which he made no significant changes 
to Buridan’s classification  37, adding only the debasements concerning the «  money 
ratio » - i.e. the ratio of values between gold and silver money - and, of course,  treating 
this more extensively. 
The importance of the question of the debasements of money comes from the 
fact that they represented a foremost instrument for monetary policy. Behind each kind 
                                                 
36 Buridan also considered as a special case of debasements the exchange of money, to which he 
devoted an entire article (In Octo Libros Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 3). 
37 For Oresme, debasements might concern the figure (Treatise, chap. 9), the ratio (chap. 10), 





































of debasement, one can find a particular use of this instrument, and the judgement upon 
it depends on its effect on the common good. In this regard, the admitted reading 
according to which Buridan, and especially Oresme, rigorously forbade the principle of 
the debasement of money, has to be qualified. 
It will probably seem a bit provocative to assert that neither Buridan nor Oresme 
condemned debasement of money as a principle. But the provocation is not so harmful: 
when a debasement was condemned, it was never per se, but according to whether it 
harmed the common good; and if this condemnation appears as a rule, principally in 
Oresme’s Treatise, it is a consequence not of the nature of the debasement, but of an 
assessment of the effects induced by several debasements and, still more, of the possible 
discrepancy between the Prince’s private good and the common good. Let us consider 
these points in more depth. 
The explanation and the justification of money for Buridan and Oresme lay in its 
subordination to the common good - for the final cause of money concerns every person 
in the community. Thus, if money already exists, a debasement decided by the Prince, 
compromising its material or formal cause, would contradict the part assigned to the 
efficient cause - which was, through the guarantee of the Prince, to suppress some kind 
of uncertainty in monetary exchanges - threatening the existence of this money itself. 
The prejudice to the common good is then evident, and the debasement of money must 
unambiguously be condemned. On the other hand, the threat against money does not 
come solely from the intervention of the Prince. In such an alternative, a change 
concerning the figure, the ratio, the appellation, the weight, or the material might restore 
the appropriate quantity, structure and value of money, and thus suppress the 
uncertainty or the prejudice linked with its weight and material. Here, a debasement of 
money would be perfectly licit. 
2.3. Buridan’s solution: a redefinition of the Prince 
The structure of Buridan’s article 2 of question 11 makes this quite obvious. The 
notes 2 and 3 respectively concern the most important debasements - those which affect 
the material and weight of the money. Buridan introduced two types of debasements of 
material, and one type of debasement of weight. Each case was divided into two 
subcases, within which the approach was always the same. In the first, he dealt with a 
debasement «  according to the will of the Prince alone, without the good of the 





































« without utility for the community » (Ibid., note 2 and note 3)  38, and condemned it. 
But in the second subcase, he mentioned those situations in which a debasement is licit: 
as a consequence of « too high an increase in the material, that is when the material is 
too common and its price too low » (Ibid., note 2), or « in the interest of public affairs; 
that is in order to tax the merchants » (Ibid.), or also « if the material remains the same, 
whilst the weight is reduced at the same time as the price [is reduced] » (Ibid., note 3).  
Of course, no simple conclusion can be drawn from this analysis. Buridan’s 
formulation attests to this persisting ambiguity: if «  for the common good, the 
debasement of money is licit  »  (Ibid., conclusion  3), it cannot be allowed «  for the 
private good, either of the Prince or of somebody else  »  (Ibid., conclusion 2). But 
particular emphasis was laid on the fact that « the debasement of money may licitly be 
carried out only by the one [the Prince] who has the power to ordinate money » 39. And 
it is clearly this right to make debasements of money which is troublesome, because it 
might contradict the duty of the Prince to achieve these debasements alone which would 
improve the common good. The way Buridan resolved this difficulty is interesting. We 
have already pointed to the great conscientiousness with which he established that for 
the virtuous Prince, the common good ought to prevail over his private good. In this 
connection, he argued that, as the debasements of money are licit only according to this 
common good, the right to make debasements only belongs to the virtuous Prince  40. 
And what if the Prince is not virtuous? Buridan’s answer was strictly political, and 
aimed at promoting the subjects’ control over the Prince. Moreover, he concluded that 
this Prince who prefers his own private good « is only called a Prince, and he is not a 
Prince » (Ibid., a. 2, doubt, answer). The consistency of Buridan’s position then clearly 
appears: as a principle, the debasement does not raise any objection as long as it is a 
right exercised by this newly defined Prince 41. 
Consistent as it was, this position, however, happened to be very flimsy. Buridan 
showed himself quite uncomfortable when dealing with the King or the Emperor, 
«  whose power is unlimited, who does not recognise any law  » (In Octo Libros 
Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 2, doubt, note 2). He prudently avoided discussing the case of 
these Princes who escape the control of their subjects. And this was not only a political 
                                                 
38 See also Ibid., conclusion 3. 
39 Ibid., note 8. See also conclusion 1: « the one who constitutes it [the money] is the one who 
debases it ». 
40 In Octo Libros Politicorum, I, q. 11, a. 2, doubt, conclusions 2 and 3. 





































failure of his construction: it was, as well, a theoretical failure. Whenever an elected 
Prince is vicious, he must be deposed. But what if the King is vicious? If again an 
elected Prince is vicious, he cannot truly be called a Prince. But which word shall we 
use to designate a vicious King? 
3. The Prince as a calculator 
Facing the King, we have no more power, and no more words. The great merit of 
Nicholas Oresme was to give us back this power and these words. This means that 
Oresme’s contribution must not be evaluated as a singular construction, only related to 
his political involvements, and suddenly coming into the world in the mid-fourteenth 
century: the Treatise on Money firstly appears as an attempt to give proper answers to 
questions previously raised by Buridan. 
However, the structure of the Treatise is very different from that of Buridan’s 
article 2 of question 11. Buridan focused on a balanced appreciation of the incidence on 
the common good of various debasements of money, and he never doubted that the 
Prince had the right to mutate it. Oresme did, and this right of debasement appears as a 
leading question in his work. The Treatise seems to be organised around an attempt to 
give it a proper answer. 
3.1. The property of money 
Two arguments, not always clearly distinguished, lead to acknowledgement that 
money is a property of the community. Firstly, money - as already stated - derives its 
existence from the interest of each member of the community; secondly, it becomes, on 
the occasion of each transaction and for each seller, a property which is substituted for 
the property of natural wealth: « if someone gives his bread, or the labour of his own 
body in exchange for money, this money belongs to him when he receives it, as much as 
his bread or the labour of his body he was free to use as he wanted, supposing he was 
not a serf » (Treatise, chap. 6). 
Hence, when Oresme concluded that it was the Prince’s responsibility to make 
money, it was surely not, as the feudal tradition taught, because he had any title to the 
ownership of money. On the contrary, this conclusion was only reached as a convenient 
solution for the community: « it was ordained formerly, and that in order to prevent 
fraud, that nobody may make money, [...] but on the contrary that the money [...] should 





































duty [...]. And since the Prince is a more public person, and of a higher authority, it is 
convenient that, for the community, he should have money made » (Ibid., chap. 5). This 
could explain why, according to Oresme, minting money gives rise to seignorage 42; but 
- unlike Buridan - it does not open the path to a right to mutate money. In Oresme’s 
view, the latter only belongs to the community as an immediate consequence of its 
property right, and as protection against the Prince himself 43. 
3.2. The effects of a debasement of money 
It is worth noting that the property right argument, though sufficient to explain 
that the right of debasement is attributed to the community, does not stand alone. As a 
supplementary argument, the protection against the Prince brings to light the effects of 
the debasements. These effects could be understood either independently of the author 
of the debasement, or in relation with him. 
The first case opens the path to a general assessment of debasements, 
disregarding the specific consequences, possibly induced by a Prince in search of his 
private good. In comparison with Buridan’s position, the set of circumstances which 
allow a debasement of money is, for Oresme, much narrower. The reader of the Treatise 
has to wait until chapter 10 to find an obvious statement of a permitted debasement. 
These few pages, dedicated to the « debasement of the ratio » - the relative prices of the 
different types of money in a multimetalist system - provide the occasion to examine a 
debasement which improves the common good: the ratio between the values of gold and 
silver money must be set in accordance with the « natural relation in value of gold to 
silver ». This is nothing but a simple extension to the coexistence of gold and silver 
money of the principle formerly established according to which the price of money has 
to follow the price of the metal of which it is composed 44. Oresme never admitted that 
in other circumstances, a debasement of money could generate positive effects on the 
common good. The reason is that each time a debasement is suggested, its negative 
consequences would overcompensate for its positive effects which, most of the time, 
                                                 
42 Treatise, chap. 7. 
43 « [...] it appears from chapters one ["Why money was invented"] and six ["To whom does the 
money belong"]  that money belongs to the community itself. And that is why, and in order to prevent the 
Prince from inventing by guile a reason [...] for mutating the money ratio, the community alone has the 
right to decide if, and when, how, and to what extent, this ratio is to be changed » (Ibid., chap. 10). 
Oresme went back to this theme on several occasions inside the Treatise. See, for example, chap. 13, 14 
and 22. 
44 Again, it is as a consequence of a real change concerning the metals of which the money is 





































could be achieved by means of other policies. One of the interests of this argument is 
that it reveals that, for Nicholas Oresme, the assessment of a policy is a direct 
consequence of a calculation of its possibly antagonistic effects on the common good. 
Taking this analytical position seriously leads us to wonder why a real change 
concerning metals was the only circumstance in which the balance of the effects of a 
debasement on the common good was positive. 
The answer put forward in the Treatise is at first that the community does not 
suffer any negative effect when a debasement follows a real change: under the 
guarantee of the Prince the money becomes exactly what people expected it to be. The 
balance is then necessarily positive. On the contrary, any debasement submitted to other 
ends generates negative effects. If we go on disregarding the impact of the Prince’s 
pursuit of his own private good, we could identify, with Oresme, four kinds of negative 
effects: a real income effect, a quantity of money effect, then an external trade and an 
internal trade effect.  
The first one is that most frequently observed by Oresme’s commentators. 
Stating that the purchasing power of nominal incomes is modified by a debasement of 
money 45, it is a purely mechanical effect, linked with the general acceptance of money 
as a unit of account. Although Oresme never discussed this point, it is clear that the real 
income effect always operates, even in the case when a debasement follows a real 
change in the value of the metal. Rather than an inadequacy of the exposition, this 
seems to be a consequence of the fact that such a debasement would correct real 
incomes, so that they regain their former levels. In this respect, the restitution of the 
previous structure of the distribution contributes to the common good - whilst the same 
real income effect, through other debasements, would diminish it. Obviously, this is a 
supplementary reason to argue that a debasement in reaction to a real change in the 
material of money has only positive effects. 
The three other effects are analysed in chapter 20 of the Treatise, as 
« disadvantages for the whole community ». A withdrawal of the material for money 
(and even a falsification of money), a decrease in commodities imports as well as in the 
volume of internal trade were presented as the responses to a debasement which moves 
                                                 
45 This is introduced in chapter 8 of the Treatise: « [...] the currency and the price of money in 
the kingdom must be so to speak a law and a fixed ordinance. This is indicated by the fact that pensions 
and some yearly incomes are reckoned according to the price of money, that is to say according to a fixed 
number of pounds or shillings »; the same idea is mentioned again in the discussion of the debasement of 






































the value of money away from the value of the metal. These responses first occur 
because such a debasement gives rise to reallocations of activities, directing them 
towards other countries - where the same amount of commodities could be exchanged 
for a greater amount of gold - or by substituting for them arbitrages between money: 
«  [...] because of such changes and depreciations, gold and silver decrease in the 
kingdom; because if no supervision prevents it, they are taken abroad, where they are 
more valuable. For men try to take their money where they think it to be worth much 
more. So there follows a decrease in the material used for money into the kingdom. [...]. 
Again, because of these debasements, good quality commodities or natural wealth 
would cease to be brought from a foreign kingdom into the one where money is so 
changed, since merchants, in preference to other places, choose to go to those places 
where they receive certain and good money »  (Ibid., chap. 20; my italics, A.L.). That 
surely must be acknowledged as one of the first explicit formulations of an allocation 
mechanism that in Oresme’s view is moved by the private interest of the traders. Its 
distributive consequences make this part of the community richer, which then 
« increases its own wealth through contemptible gain » 46 at the expense of the active 
part of the community 47. But these debasements also bring uncertainty to the material 
and to the weight that the Prince, as an efficient cause of money, was precisely 
supposed to cancel  48. Facing this last - and major - prejudice, harmful to the whole 
community, any advantage joined to it appears negligible: while a debasement 
answering a real change serves the common good since it confirms money in its 
functions, all other debasements, for the same reason, deserve it. 
Now, paying some consideration to the action of the Prince as the author of the 
debasements does not substantially alter these conclusions. However, this allowed 
Oresme to supplement the analysis with a thorough study of the behaviour of the Prince, 
and gave him original insights into the regulation and control process of the 
debasements of money. 
                                                 
46 According to Oresme, « such are money changers, money traders, or dealers in base coinage » 
(Ibid., chap. 21). 
47 « Some parts of the community are at work on tasks honourable or useful to the whole State, 
such as increasing and managing natural wealth in order to satisfy the needs of the community; such are 
churchmen, judges, merchants, craftsmen and the like  » (Ibid.). It is noticeable that this order of 
occupations reflects Oresme’s scale of values - the churchman is the first, while the craftsman is the last - 
and that the Prince is missing in this enumeration. 
48 Cf. also, in Oresme’s comments on the Ethics: « one should not change the value and the price 
of money, except in very rare cases for the public good. For it [money] is the measure of things which are 





































Again unlike Buridan, Oresme did not require the Prince to be redefined in order 
to escape an analytical difficulty. Assuming that the Prince could be interested in his 
private good is equivalent to considering him a merchant, trying to increase his gain: 
« the main and final cause why the Prince wants to give himself the power of debasing 
money, is to gain or benefit from it: for it would otherwise be pointless for him to make 
so many and such great changes for nothing » (Ibid., chap. 15). On such grounds, it is 
easy to see that a Prince who was not exclusively turned towards his subjects’ common 
good would decrease this by looking after his own private ends. Oresme summarised his 
position by imagining a kind of trade-off between the community and the Prince: « the 
more the Prince gains from it [the debasement of money], the more the community 
suffers from it » (Ibid.). In other words, the sovereign would add specific distributive 
effects to the general effects of a debasement. The most obvious effect is that each 
debasement allows him to collect a new seignorage, at the expense of the community 49. 
But other and more complex effects are also taken into account, which depend on the 
foremost position of the Prince, and on his informational advantage: Oresme paid 
special attention to speculative behaviour, which would benefit either the Prince 50 or a 
class of initiates 51. 
Oresme’s appraisal of a Prince who imposes an illegitimate debasement and 
earns profit from his informational advantage was very harsh and gave rise to an 
interesting parallel with usury. In both cases, the use of money could not constitute a 
fair argument, justifying the payment of a specific income, because for the Prince as for 
the lender, this would mean selling the use of something which does not belong to them. 
But Oresme argued that while the gain generated by a debasement is already unjust for 
the harm that it inflicts on the community, it is still more blameworthy than the usurious 
gain: in this last case, the existence of an interest loan at least involved an agreement 
between parties 52; but conversely, those who benefited from a debasement could never 
                                                 
49 See Treatise, chap. 7 and 9. 
50 The Prince who changes the ratio of value between gold and silver money « could unduly 
draw to himself his subjects’ money, as if he bought money at a low price, for silver, and after having 
raised its price, he sold his gold or gold money, or did the same with silver » (Treatise, chap. 10). The 
same analysis appears on the occasion of the study of the debasements of the material (chap. 13), and 
when the injustice of the gain of a debasement is discussed (chap. 15). 
51 « [...] when the Prince does not inform the people of the date and the nature of the future 
debasement of money he intends to make, some as a precautionary measure or through friends secretly 
foresee it, and then buy goods with weak money, and then sell them in exchange for strong money, and 
quickly get rich, and unduly draw a gain, against the legitimate course of natural trade » (Ibid., chap. 21). 
52 On the significance of the agreement between parties within the doctrine of usury, see 





































argue that such an agreement was given by the other members of the community. It is 
not only at the expense of his subjects that a Prince achieves a debasement, but also 
without their knowing it 53. 
Now comes the question of regulation and control that Buridan’s identification 
between the « Prince » and the « good Prince » made it possible to avoid. The necessity 
of a control simply arises from the uncertainty concerning the Prince’s virtue - that is, 
his exclusive interest in the common good. 
3.3. Regulation, incentives and control: the limits to the power of the 
Prince 
Several chapters of the Treatise were directly devoted to the analysis of the 
Prince’s power  54. Oresme clearly refused to engage in Buridan’s subtle distinctions 
between the different categories of princes, and did not pay especial attention to the case 
of the King or of the Emperor as being separate from any of the other princes. Although 
he gave a detailed presentation of the Prince’s duties, aiming at showing what he ought 
to be, he never concluded this could grant him any superiority in the community: 
« while being greater and more powerful than any of his subjects, he is yet inferior in 
strength and means than the whole community, and so stands in the middle » (Ibid., 
chap. 25). Concerning a right of debasement which belongs, without contest, to the 
community, this implies that the Prince has neither better knowledge nor more virtuous 
understanding  than the community has of the conditions under which it must be 
achieved. So, the first and obviously better way to spare the community the negative 
effects of a debasement carried out by the Prince, is to put it into their hands. Since, of 
course, this would allow the identity of ownership with control of money, it would also 
avoid any agency problem 55. 
                                                 
53 Oresme’s words are worth quoting in full: « In fact, the usurer has lent his money to someone 
who takes it voluntarily, and then can enjoy it or use it to provide for his own needs, and what he repays 
in excess of the principal has been determined by voluntary contract between the parties, but, by an undue 
change in the money, the Prince plainly receives the money of his subjects against their will » (Treatise, 
chap. 17). 
54 See chap. 19, 23, 24, 25, and 26 of the Treatise. 
55 However, the community is not able to make use of its money with complete freedom. In spite 
of its ownership, the right of debasement cannot be used unless it improves the common good. It must be 
recalled that the acknowledged scholastic understanding of  the right of property always considered it as 
limited by the interests of the community. Applied to the question of the debasements of money, this led 
Oresme to assess that « neither the community nor anyone can justly misuse his own property or use it 





































Obvious as it is, this solution has the disadvantage of introducing a break 
between the exercise of the right of debasement and the efficient cause of money. So, 
the general case, studied by Oresme, is one in which the Prince has the authority to 
make debasements. What then is the foundation of this authority over debasements? 
After having carefully ruled out any supposed absolute necessity, but also the Pope or 
the Emperor  56, Oresme answered that it could never come from an alienation of the 
right of debasement from the community to the Prince, this right being considered as 
« nearly [...] natural »  57. The foundation of the Prince’s authority is thus a mandate, 
given by the community: « if it [the community] entrusts the Prince with this task [the 
debasement of money], within a reasonable limit, [...] the Prince would not undertake it 
as main author, but as the executor of a public ordinance » (Ibid., chap. 24). 
Nicholas Oresme then faced what would nowadays be a classical agency 
problem, where the community appears as the «  principal  » and the Prince as the 
« agent ». Both could have different objectives - in such a case, when the Prince « seeks 
his own good more than the common good of his subjects », he is called a « tyrant » 
(Ibid., chap. 25) 58 - and both have different information. 
From this point of view, the diffusion of the ideas developed in the Treatise 
already represents a first level of control, because it informs the community of the 
limited cases in which the debasement of money is legitimate and, at the same time, it 
informs the Prince that the community is aware of this. Consequently, the various 
justifications dismantled by Oresme throughout the Treatise could no longer be voiced 
by the Prince. If he keeps seeking his private good, the Prince is then condemned to 
appeal to the few actual reasons for a debasement, in order to hide his objective from his 
subjects’ eyes 59. 
Of course, he might fail to mislead his subjects; after all, the Treatise contains 
the elements required for a fair assessment of the monetary policy, and the community, 
or its « most eminent part », cannot remain mistaken for too long. On the other hand, 
                                                 
56 The arguments in favor of a right of debasement belonging to the Prince, and Oresme’s 
answers, are respectively stated in chapters 23 and 24 of the Treatise. 
57  « [...] res quae spectat alicui quasi de jure naturali » (Ibid., chap. 24). Oresme added that 
« just as the community cannot authorize the Prince to have the power to abuse any of the citizen’s wives 
because he would like to do so, it cannot give him such a privilege over money ». 
58 As Langholm ([1983], p. 17) observed, the concept of « tyrant », in Oresme’s Treatise, clearly 
comes from Aristotle’s Politics. 
59 For instance, at the end of the chapter where he established that a real change concerning gold 
and silver money constitutes a basis for a debasement, Oresme discussed the possibility that the Prince 





































one cannot completely dismiss the possibility that the Prince could succeed in his 
enterprise. In both cases, other levels of control had to be explored. 
In this respect, it is useful to recall that Buridan’s article 2 of question 11 and 
Oresme’s Treatise belong to quite different literary genres. Whereas Buridan’s work is a 
good illustration of the Scholastic tradition, Oresme’s Treatise would now be 
acknowledged as an essay, chiefly aiming at persuading its readers. This could appear 
as a negligible difference. To me that is not so. For the Treatise is a rhetorical text. And 
this must be taken literally: when Aristotle’s Rhetorics was translated into Latin, in the 
mid-thirteenth century, it was not considered as a work about eloquence, but as an 
appendix to moral and political philosophy 60. This was linked with an original feature 
of Aristotle’s book, namely the part played by the inventio - as distinct from the elocutio 
and from the dispositio. As is well known, the inventio creates an opportunity to assess 
the weight of a reasoning, when there is no evidence that it is absolutely true 61. Taking 
the Treatise as an essay in persuasion therefore does not lead to underestimating its 
theoretical content. On the contrary, it allows a perception of its most eminent reader - 
the Prince - as a listener of the rhetors. As such, he can now be viewed as committed to 
the various goals that the Aristotelian rhetor tries to reach 62, now able to reassess, in the 
light of the Treatise, the consequences of the decision to mutate the money. He is able 
to weigh and compare the opposite consequences of his action on his private good. In 
other words, he is a calculator. 
 Oresme’s great skill was then to emphasize the fact that, if the Prince persists in 
his intention of carrying out a debasement, he shows himself to be a bad calculator or, at 
least, a badly informed calculator, because he remains under the influence of those 
rhetors - his advisors - whose private interest is opposed to the community’s as well as 
his own interest 63: the Prince’s private interest, which impelled him to alter the money, 
should prevent him from persisting in his intention. Hence, it is not a plea for the 
                                                 
60  Giles of Roma wrote a book devoted to The Differences Between Rhetorics, Ethics, and 
Politics. On this question, see J. Murphy [1974]. 
61 Such a preoccupation was recurrent in Oresme’s work. The Quodlibeta, for instance, are 
permeated with a permanent quest for sounder explanations, when nature as well as divination is 
concerned (see S. Caroti [1990]). So that the fight against astrology and superstitions supplies another 
example of a rhetorical text: S. Lefèvre [1990] rightly pointed out some similarities between the Livre de 
Divinacions and the Traictie des Monnoies. 
62 See the Rhetorics, I, chap. 5. 
63 Oresme strongly denounced « the duplicity of flatterers, who have always urged princes to be 
tyrants [...]. For these flatterers [...] cunningly deceive the naïve ears of the Princes who judge others by 






































common good which is supposed to convince the Prince. When he acts like a merchant, 
it is only an argument for merchants which could persuade him. In various ways, 
Oresme undertook to show that the primary positive effects of a debasement on the 
private good of the Prince indirectly arouse negative - and dominant - effects, thus 
contradicting his actual interest. 
As several commentators rightly underlined, those negative effects come at first 
sight from moral and political sanctions  64. Facing the Prince who is insufficiently 
informed of all the consequences of his decision, Nicholas Oresme recalled that 
debasements in material or in weight, when « some coins are inscribed with the name of 
God, or some saint, and with the sign of the cross », would be at least a sin of « lie and 
perjury » 65, and at most a transgression of the biblical commandment which forbids 
taking « the name of the Lord thy God in vain » (Treatise, chap. 13) 66. Later on, he put 
the blame on the Prince, emphasizing his responsibility for growing uncertainty about 
the value of money, manifestly expecting that he would be more sensitive to the ruin of 
his reputation than he was to the transgression of God’s precepts 67. However, although 
these religious and moral sanctions should not be underestimated in the context of the 
Middle-Ages, their efficiency was limited to cases where the gain for the Prince from 
the debasement, is lower than the prejudice he incurs. Political sanctions then appear to 
be much more conclusive, for they threaten not only marginally the level of the Prince’s 
private good, but the simple existence of his government, for himself and for the whole 
royal line.  
It seems clear that Oresme hesitated to state the nature of these political 
sanctions precisely, and the way they occur. In chapter 19, for instance, when he 
discussed the « disadvantages for the Prince because of the debasements of money », he 
focused on moral and religious feedback. In fact, he only aimed at demonstrating that a 
tyrant cannot last long 68, adding up the reasons why in a country where people are not 
                                                 
64 See, for example, J. Wolff [1973], pp. 82-83. 
65 A similar position is adopted in the Gloss on the Politics, I, 10. 
66 Such religious interdicts are much more efficient than we could imagine, for they directly 
concern such policies as those of the king of France, John the Good, who tried to conceal his numerous 
debasements from his subjects (the livre tournois had its value changed seventy-one times from 1351 to 
1360). L. Wolowski ([1864], p. 3, n. 3) quotes Michelet’s Histoire de France on this subject. 
67  Treatise, chap. 19. In the same way, Oresme also noticed that the Prince, as bound as 
everyone, by this Lord’s other commandment to honour his parents, would « devalue the honour of his 
ancestors, when he does away with their good money, and has it destroyed together with their image ». 
68 Oresme used the picture of the human body, as an organicist representation of society, and 
argued that an excessive concentration of power in the head (the government) could only be made at the 





































accustomed to being submitted to serfdom such a government could never succeed in 
imposing itself  69. But he never made explicit how this government would collapse. 
Some incidental remarks alone, attest that Oresme had in mind a transfer of power from 
one family to another, or a foreign conquest 70. In a certain way, he was not as daring as 
Buridan was, since he never suggested that the people should depose the Prince who 
betrays the common good. But, as a counterpart, his understanding of the Prince was 
more extensive, for his conclusions covered all kinds of governments, including the 
King and the Emperor. Was Oresme then simply a prudent man, restricting his pen in 
order not to clash head-on with his royal readers? Probably not: his biography attests 
that he was able, when necessary, to contradict even the Pope’s views 71. But he seems 
to have been aware that, while religious and moral sanctions were short term answers, a 
political sanction resulting in the fall of a government, though more conclusive, was 
also much more uncertain, and presumably a matter for a long term solution, so that its 
relative weight in the Prince’s calculation might be too low. 
This could explain the importance Oresme attached to economic incentives. 
These are of two types. The first deals directly with the Prince’s income - the 
seignorage - as a result of the minting of money. The difference between the value of 
the money and the value of the metal was accurately identified as the sum of the cost of 
minting and of seignorage, both being chargeable to the community, as the owner of 
money 72. Against the idea that the earnings of the Prince should be fixed first, Oresme 
took the side of a fixed difference between the respective value of the money and of the 
metal: « this fixed portion of money should be large enough to cover more than the cost 
of minting money at all times. And if money can be made at a lower cost, it is quite fair 
that the remainder [residuum] should go to the distributor or ordainer, that is to the 
Prince or the master of money, and so constitute a sort of pension  » (Treatise, 
chap. 7) 73. Whenever the community adopts this rule of distribution, it makes up for its 
lack of information about the technical and economic conditions of the production of 
money, for it ensures a convergence of the Prince’s private good with the common 
                                                 
69 Ibid., chap. 26. 
70 « [S]ince if the power of tyrants is great, it is yet violent to the free hearts of subjects, and 
weak against foreigners » (Ibid., chap. 26). 
71 In 1363, Oresme delivered a violent sermon in Avignon, in order to persuade Pope Urban V 
not to go back to Rome 
72  See Treatise, chap. 7. 
73 Oresme nevertheless added that this portion must be moderate, for « if such a portion or 





































good: the « master of money » is interested in doing his utmost in order to diminish the 
cost of minting as greatly as possible. On the other hand, the justification of this 
payment, which benefits the Prince, rests not on his right of property - the money 
remains a property of the community - but on the service provided to the community: 
the figure stamped on each coin certifies the weight and composition of the money. For 
the Prince’s subjects, it is then the price to be paid in order to obtain information, the 
lack of which would compromise their transactions, and the private acquisition of which 
would be costly, because it would oblige them to weigh and assay their means of 
payment. 
The previous rule of distribution is, of course, an incentive for the efficient 
minting of money. However, it offers no protection against debasement. On the 
contrary, the Prince is interested in multiplying such operations, in order to increase his 
income, not only by lowering the cost of minting, but also by cumulating the 
seignorages associated with each debasement. This gives primary importance to the 
second type of economic incentives with which the Prince is faced. Interestingly, it is 
not an institutional device, set up by the community to control the Prince’s policy, but 
what could be called an economic regulation process, generated by the merchants’ 
search for their private good, in answer to the Prince’s search for his. 
In chapter 20 of the Treatise, Oresme summed up the disadvantages for the 
community of the debasements of money. Among them, some have a direct - and 
negative - influence on the Prince’s private good. On the one hand, Oresme remarked 
that bad money, «  counterfeit money  », is brought into the kingdom  74, hence 
compromising the Prince’s gain. On the other hand, the difference between the value of 
the metals of which the money is composed and its legal price would cause a movement 
of gold and silver from the kingdom, « for men try to take their money where they think 
it is worth much more  »; the resulting shortage would then concern not only the 
community, but also the Prince himself. Hence, both processes make the Prince a 
casualty, among others, of the reallocation of precious metals generated by the 
debasement of money. 
                                                 
74 After Macleod [1896], p. 38, this has led some commentators to consider Oresme a forerunner 





































Oresme’s portrayal of the Prince embodies all of the manipulative freedom 
associated with the metalist approach to money. Where Buridan only succeeded in 
describing the main aspects of a monetary policy in accordance with the common good, 
Oresme gave an account of a Prince whose objectives might remain close to the 
merchants’. Monetary policy was then, by its very nature, deeply transformed: the 
search for the common good requires a roundabout way; it is not virtue that impels the 
Prince to seek the common good, but only his recognition that the public good also 
serves his private good. And although this process is visible, at least for readers of 
medieval monetary contributions, its hand is no less efficient. 
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University of Paris I Panthéon - Sorbonne 
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